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1. Jtesearch Objectives
We are focusing on in-flight problem diagnosis. Suppose, for example, 
a pilot simultaneously experiences over-heating in one engine and aileron 
reverse. He might attribute the problem to the hydraulic system, but 
unless he possessed detailed technical knowledge of the particular air­
craft, he might not be able to decide which sub-assembly component became 
disfunctional. However, exactly how and where the problem occurred may 
have implications for how to deal with it. Indeed, a naively plausible, 
but wrong, assessment of the problem may lead the pilot to exacerbate 
rather than improve his situation. An on-board intelligent computer system 
to aid in diagnosis and to suggest corrective measures would be of great 
help.
There are a number of essential attributes of such a system. First, 
the system must have a detailed internal model of the particular aircraft. 
This includes sub-assemblies of the plane, how they relate, and how the 
plane works as a whole. Second, the system must be able to communicate its 
diagnoses and suggestions in an efficient and effective manner. It must be 
efficient because in emergencies time is at a premium. It must be effec­
tive or the pilot will routinely reject its advice. This dictates a high 
level language, perhaps even a natural language, interface between the sys­
tem and the pilot through which the system can engage in intelligent com­
munication about the problem with the pilot. The system must be able to 
give its reasons for its assessments and be be responsive to counter 
suggestions from the pilot. Thus, third, the system must have knowledge of 
its own internal workings. Fourth, ths system ought to benefit from its 
previous experiences and previous discussions with pilots and other 
experts. Of course, the realization of a system such as this is far in the 
future. However, we believe that significant progress can currently be 
made towards this goal.
Such a system raises a number of theoretically important issues of 
interest to the investigators. Very broadly, the issues are: 1) developing 
computer representations for physical mechanisms, 2) intelligent modeling 
of those mechanisms, 3) high level natural language communication between 
humans and computers, and 4) learning from experience and instruction.
These issues are very complex and, although they will interact 
strongly in the ultimate system, initially they must be studied separately. 
To be tractable, the sub-problems must be of a manageable size. Further­
more, a modern jet aircraft is a phenomenally complicated object. In fact, 
it is far too involved and complicated to be useable as an initial domain. 
Thus, our first work is being done on more simplified domains. After gain­
ing experience and understanding of the basic issues involved the tech­
niques so learned will be applied to the difficult domain of in-flight 
fault diagnosis.
The remainder of this report is divided into three sections. Each 
describes the progress reported by one investigator. Several sections
2contribute to more than one of the four facets of the in-flight 
problem (representation, mechanism modeling, natural language, 
ing).
diagnosis 
and learn-
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2..JL. itepresenting event concepts
It is important for an expert system in the aircraft flight domain to 
be able to represent sy.ent.3 .typea and specific events in forms that allow a 
program to (1) recognize When a given type of event is occurring by looking 
at sensor outputs, (2) express in a comprehensible way what event(s) are 
occurring at any given time, and (3) understand high-level commands to 
carry out events sufficiently to fill in all the actions necessary to 
accomplish the events. We believe that it is important for our systems to 
be able to use concepts from natural language for these purposes, in order 
to make such systems maximally comprehensible to their users as well as to 
their builders and maintainers. We believe that it is also appropriate to 
use natural language structures as starting points for expressing func­
tional and conceptual structures of mechanisms, given that we want to be 
able to communicate with our systems about the operation of components at a 
variety of levels of abstraction. At the same time, we want our represen­
tations of components and mechanisms to reflect true causal relationships.
We have therefore been developing representation mechanisms that are 
capable of encoding information about causal connections, timing, con­
currency, rates, durations, forces, quantities,
In their simplest forms, event shape diagrams have a time line, a scale, 
and values on the scale at one or more points. There are three basic event 
shape diagrams, illustrated in Figure 1.*
Diagrams can be used to represent concurrent processes, causation, and 
other temporal relations by aligning two or more diagrams, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the representation for neatn Note that four 
simple diagrams are aligned, and that each has different kinds of scales, 
and different event shapes. Causal relations also hold between the events 
described in each simple diagram. The names for the causal relations are 
adopted from Rieger’s CSA work [Rieger 1975]. The action Eating stops in 
this default case where "desire to eat" goes to zero. "Desire to eat" sums 
up in one measure coercion, habit, and other factors as well as hunger. 
Typical values for amounts of food, time required to eat, and so on are 
also associated with the diagram, to be used as default values.
*While diagrams are shown here, data structures to represent these di­
agrams are very easy to program.
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6More levels of detail can be added if needed. For instance, the action 
diagram can be expanded so that eating involves many recurrences of putting 
food in one's mouth, biting, chewing, and swallowing, and the diagram for 
the amount of food inside the agent can reflect a series of stepwise 
changes as each mouthful is ingested.
We are attempting to model various characteristics of physical 
objects, such as typical uses and typical failures, limits of normal use 
(i.e. when the device may break down even under ideal operating conditions, 
expected life, etc.), and causality and connec- tions between separate dev­
ices. We have looked at simple models for a battery, a flashlight, and a 
bicycle pump. Currently we are attempting to model the gas turbine engines 
typically used in aircraft.
The model for the battery and flashlight takes into account such fac­
tors as time and temperature. The battery model included information as to 
the effects of long term storage, continuous use in a particular device’ (5 
hours of use in a tape recorder as opposed to a flashlight, for example), 
and the effects of temperature (i.e. a battery which functions well at 70 
degrees f. may not function at all at -50 degrees f.). Consideration was 
also given as to the type of battery (i.e. regular carbon battery, heavy 
duty battery, or alkaline). The flashlight model used some of the concepts 
developed by Ken Forbus, such as preconditions of use, causality between 
various parts, and influences. The model was then further extended to 
include information concerning timing, and information as to when a partic­
ular part may fail. The latter information could be obtained from using 
models of individual parts, such as the one derived for the battery.
Event Shape Diagrams have been applied to model a bicycle pump. 
Event Shape Diagrams were found to be good at showing rates of change and 
recurring events and for giving a sense of elapsed time in an event. They 
all consisted of continuous lines or curves joined by discontinuities 
where significant events occurred. Event Shape Diagrams however commit the 
model to one sequence of events where parallelism of events is possible, as 
well as fixed levels and rates of change. Thus they model a specific 
instance of an event well, but do not capture a generic event as well. 
Causality among events is also weakly modeled. Flow, motion, and other 
properties dependent upon the physical connection of mechanisms are only 
indirectly modeled.
Z - Z - flatmal Language Processing
We have been working on a parallel, analogue model for knowledge 
integration and decision-making in the context of natural language process­
ing. Essentially, the model involves dynamically constructing an unstable 
weighted network of possibilities, while concurrently sifting and stabiliz­
ing the network such that the "best" interpretation is highlighted.
7A feasibility study was performed by manually creating a network for 
the (syntactically) ambiguous sentence:
John ate up the street.
The procedure for setting up the network was based on breadth-first chart 
parsing [Kay, 1973; Hobbs, 1974]. Using a straightforward mathematical for­
malism for spreading activation and lateral inhibition [McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1980], the network stabilized on the prepositional reading of 
"up". Next, the weights in the network were slightly adjusted, and the 
adverbial reading of "up" was selected. Finally, some preliminary semantics 
were added, at the level of case-frames, and the prepositional reading was 
selected again. These results are reported in a paper for the 1982 Cogni­
tive Science Conference [Pollack & Waltz, 1982].
The first implementation was used for the feasibility demonstration 
above, and included mainly syntax knowledge; progress is being made on the 
second generation program, which will contain both syntactic and case-frame 
knowledge in a better organized network structure. Furthermore, although 
the first few generations will work at the sentence level, the goals of 
this research include the integration of discourse level knowledge.
The parallel organization of processing being developed here is quite 
amenable to integrated circuit implementation, with its restrictions on 
physical connectivity [Sutherland & Mead, 1977]. A recent exercise [Pol­
lack, 1982a] demonstrated one possible implementation technique, based on 
integrating arithmetic with message passing.
While the use of spreading activation and lateral inhibition networks 
for language processing has been my central concern, this work bears 
directly on other research within the distributed robotics project. I have 
built networks which demonstrate repetitive and causal behaviors —  this is 
directly related to the work on event modeling [Waltz, 1982]. Also, spread­
ing activation has historically been used in memory priming and schema 
selection techniques [Collins & Quillian, 1972; Ortony, 1976; Fahlman, 
1979], so the research on schema acquisition [Dejong, 1982] could be aided 
by exploration in this area.
Interlisp
Interlisp-VAX was obtained from USC-ISI in order to provide an alter­
nate environment to Franz Lisp on the CSL VAX. Interlisp-VAX, is
equivalent to Interlisp-10, and is now up and available for use here at 
CSL.
83. Diagnosis and Design of Mechanisms using Deep-Level Understanding Models
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Overall Objective
The purpose of this research is to develop a unified theory of computer-based 
diagnosis and design of mechanisms through the construction of deep-level under 
standing models. This approach is based on the premise that neither the table- 
lookup approach nor the production system approach of the present variety will 
allow enough in-depth knowledge to be' represented, made available conveniently 
to deal with difficult circumstances often encountered in multiple fault 
situations. In the aircraft domain redundancy is used so widely that techniques 
deal with single fault situations only are of little value in practice. Although not
our prime objective the theory of design seems to be a natural extension of this 
approach without too much additional work.
_3._2 . Why the Other Approaches are Inadequate
The shortcomings of a straight-forward table-look-up approach is quite 
obvious. Combinatorial explosion prevents us from representing each possible 
combination in the table especially when many of the variables are analog in 
nature. Yet sequential procedures are of little help as an intelligent proce­
dure usually requires judgement and therefore logical deduction.
Even though production rules can produce satisfactory results for some 
applications, their overall effectiveness is limited for several reasons:
(1) Inability to recognize a fault for which a production rules or table 
entries have been omitted by a human expert designing the systems data 
base.
(2) Omitted or inconsistent production rules can lead to wrong diagnosis.
(3) Improvements in the power of the system lead to a rapidly expanding set 
of the necessary production rules.
(4) The system is unable to diagnose multiple faults.
(5) Because of local nature of the production rules algorithm the system 
cannot explain its failures or propose meaningful tests to clear up 
ambiguities.
9(6) Since the system is a human expert’s understanding of the domain it 
cannot recognize inconsistencies in the provided rules. Inconsis­
tent rules can be introducèd if the domain is updated after a lapse 
of time.
We expect to build a system that deals with all those problems by basing 
our diagnostic algorithm on the deep-level understanding of the mechanism rather 
than performing table look-up or precondition matching to arrive at a solution. 
Through its causal understanding of how subsystems work down to the component 
level the system’s performance should approach that of a human expert. Unlike 
the production rules approach the system will recognize incompleteness of data 
necessary to make a diagnosis and will design functional tests within the 
constraints of the available sensory'data. If no such tests are possible the 
system will explain why there is no solution. The system’s extension with 
changing domain consists only of updating the domain description, limiting the 
problem of controlling the system’s integrity. Because the domain description 
is the only requirement for system's operation the system is highly portable and 
can be adapted to a wide range of domains.
_3. 3_* Understanding Deep-Level Semantics
Most of the mechanisms in airplanes are electro-mechanical involving 
electrical, mechanical and electronic principles. To begin our study with a 
mechanism of reasonable complexity and which embodies electro-mechanical 
principles we chose the case study of a refrigerator. It is quite obvious 
that any theoretical discovery in this investigation would be immediately 
applicable to most electro-mechanical system either directly or with minor 
modifications.
3_.J3._1. Principles of Refrigeration
Refrigeration is the process of moving heat from a space that you want to 
cool down to a space that you do not care if it gets heated up. The two key 
words in the definition are heat which refers to some type of heat transfer, and 
moving which refers to the circulation of a substance that can hold a quantity of 
heat.
Heat transfer is the natural process of moving heat from a warm substance to a 
colder substance. There is a rate and direction associated with it that depend 
on the temperatures and other factors of the substance.
Circulation is the movement of a substance from one space to another, the 
substance in this case is the refrigerant. The refrigerant moves heat from the 
space to be cooled to the uncontrolled space. Natural properties of the refrig­
erant make this possible even though in many cases the space to be cooled is
10
colder than the uncontrolled space. It also is a physical liquid or gas, so 
a physical circulation system to contain and move the substance is needed.
The flow graphs in Figure 3 and Figure 4 give a useful representation of 
the system. These graphs will help to show useful underlying ideas that may 
not be clear when looking at individual components and their properties. The 
two graphs show that the important properties that connect all components are 
heat transfer and refrigerant flow. It is also useful to note that refrigerant 
flow is proportional to heat transfer by some constant so there is only really 
one property that connects all components.
The nodes of the graph tell what parts of the system are interacting with 
each other. The edges tell what type of interrelationship are going on. An 
equation will be associated with each edge, the equations will be used later 
when an actual design is performed. Keeping track of the graphs and the fact 
that the heat transfer and flow at each point are equal will assure a consistent 
design in the end.
Because heat is not created in this process just moved we will assume that 
the constant H is about the same at all points. Then taking the second uncon-
sPace as a starting point and using the fact that refrigerant can carry 
heat we get the following flow graph.
Figure 3
Uncontrolled spaces 1 and 2 represent infinite heat sinks or sources and do not 
need to be connected.
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If you select any point in the circulation system and measure the flow 
you would find it to be the same at any point. For that reason you can cut 
it at any point you want and make a flow graph. We will cut it at the com­
pressor because that is the motivation for the flow.
Figure 4
the key for making a graph is
1) break the system up into separate part
2) define important jargon or ideas in each part 
(example heat transfer, flow, temperature)
3) attach magnitude, direction, etc. to each part for 
the ideas that apply so a graph can be made
The last set of values defined in the refrigeration circuit, temperature, 
has no flow associated with it. It can be used as a support value for heat 
transfer since it is an important indicator of the direction and quantity of heat 
transferred.
3. 3_. 2_. How Design Might Be Done
The key to a useful design is consistency, an example of a consistent flow 
design is given in the refrigerant flow system where the flow rate is the same 
at every node. To find underlying principles that will connect all components 
consistently it is best to list components and their properties and how the 
components interact with each other with these properties. After that flow 
graphs as in the last part help to connect the central ideas, the two graphs in 
the last part show heat transfer and refrigerant flow will connect all components 
in the refrigeration design. There are equations associated with each edge of 
the graph and the resulting set of equalities, that result from the fact that
12
heat transfer or flow at each node is the same, is the first step in design.
The next step in the design process is to come up with a specific design by 
getting values for all unknowns in the equations. This can be done by giving 
certain unknowns specific values in an attempt to put some constraints on the 
design, an example of this is setting the outside temperature to some maximum 
value like 90 degrees. You can also add other equations that do not come from 
the flow graphs, an example of that is adding cost equations for different types 
of heat transfer coils with the objective of minimizing cost. Below are the 
equations that are associated with some of the edges of the graphs and some 
assumed values for the design. Then we will make a flow chart to carry out the 
design of a refrigeration system.
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flow of refrigerant in system 
F = proportional to H 
size of pipes and valves is proportional 
to F or proportional to H
refrigerant flow through compressor 
F = (times rpm displacement)
= proportional to horsepower 
rpm = revolutions per min of motor 
displacement = volume of refrigerant taken in 
each revolution
horsepower = motor horsepower compressor
Constraints
surfacearea = constant = S1 
insidetemp = constant = TP1 
outsidetemp = constant = TP2
(difference insidetemp reftempO = constant = TD1 
(difference reftemp outsidetemp) = constant = TD2
rpm = constant = RPM
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Equations from graphs
heat transfer going through 
insulation =
H = (times(times surfacearea (difference 
outsidetemp insidetemp))heattranscoef) 
surfacearea = surface area of box 
insidetemp = inside temperature of box 
outsidetemp = outside temperature of box 
heattranscoef = heat transfer coefficient of 
the insulation
heat transfer going into or out 
of a coil
H = (times(times coilarea (difference 
reftemp outsidetemp))heattrscoil)
H = (times(times coilareal(difference 
insidetemp reftempl))heattrsciol1) 
coilarea s area of condenser 
coilareal = area of evaporator 
reftemp = refrigerant temp in condenser 
reftempl = refrigerant temp in evaporator 
heattrscoil = heat transfer coefficient cond. 
heattrscoill= heat transfer coefficient evap.
i * s'de H r e f--v—
H r e f
Be X
a
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Flow Chart
1 use flow graph and edge equations to 
get primary equations for a consistent 
design
>
2 use list of constraints to reduce the final 
number of unknowns until the number of 
unknowns and independent equations are 
equal
* r
3 if more constraints or equations not from graphs 
are needed add them
example insulation heat transfer coefficient = 
constant a HT
cost of coil type 1 to N = costl to costN 
maximum area condenser = AREAMAX 
maximum area evaporator = AREAMAX1 
cost of a coil a (times area costJ) 
objective minimize cost
tp
4 arrange equations to 
and finish design
calculate all unknowns
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3.4. The Question of Representation
The concept of CSAs (Common Sense Algorithm) have been suggested as a 
universal representation for all mechanism and processes. Although CSAs has 
been demonstrated to be usable for representing mechanisms like toilets and 
bicycles, and processes like sawing wood some serious short-comings remain.
Aside from the lack of important characteristics as the ability to quantify and 
include timing information two fundamental weaknesses exist. They are (1) the lack o 
hierarchical structure and (2) the lack of a systematic generative procedure.
If several people try to generate a CSA for a given mechanism it is very 
likely that many different CSAs will result. The mere presence of multiple CSAs 
for a simple mechanism is not by itself a disturbing fact. What is disturbing 
is the lack of understanding of the phenomenon. It is a strong indication that 
the present theory of CSA is by no means complete.
In the technical literature there is a universal accepted way of representing 
mechanism. One way, we thought, to resolve the question was to devise an auto­
matic procedure to generate CSAs directly from the schematic diagram. We grant 
you that this approach has the same problem with perspectives. That will have 
to be dealt with. At least, we will have no question as to what we started with.
Thus the problem is defined as one of devising an algorithm that wil,l accept a 
technical manual diagram of a device as input and apply engineering knowledge, 
in a manner similar to that which a paerson would use, to produce a CSA-type 1
computer representation of the device that the computer can use for operation, 
fault diagnosis, and design of the device. The resulting program will be useful
for including new devices in the distributed robotics system.
One of the first questions that must be answered is what kinds of implied 
engineering knowledge one wishes to include. Specifically, the knowledge required 
for understanding, for design, and for diagnosis. It is also important to deter­
mine what knowledge each of these uses will require.
For understanding, one needs a definition of all components (such as the 
CSA representation for each component), the specific function of each device in 
this device, the relationships between different components (the manner in which 
each component affects the others), and the function the device is intended to 
perform.
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For diagnosis, one needs all the knowledge required for understanding, plus 
additional information about the failure modes of each of the components, the 
probability each of the failure modes will occur, and the way in which each of the 
possible failure modes affects the entire system.
For design, one requires the same knowledge needed for understanding in 
addition to knowing how changing some components will affect the entire system, 
the typical ranges of inputs and outputs, and the typical use of each of the com­
ponents in the system.
Once the definition of all the devices and the implied engineering knowledge 
is stored., it remains to find an algorithm to apply the implied engineering know­
ledge to the device definitions to give the desired computer understanding of 
the device.
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1. Knowledge Based AuLomatic Schema Acquisition
Gerald DeJong 
Paul O’Rorke
1-1- Issues ln.Yg.Lved In schema learning
The concept of knowledge chunks, variously termed schemas, scripts, 
frames or MOPs has emerged to organize world knowledge in artificial intel­
ligence systems. They have been used to understand natural language, in 
planning systems, for metaphor processing, memory organization, and story 
summarizing,
Schemas can be used in an in-flight diagnosis system to represent gen­
eral solutions to often-occurring problems. Problems that crop up time and 
again ought to be handled in a more efficient manner than a never-before- 
encountered problem. For solving novel problems our systems will rely on 
the general mechanism modeling techniques described elsewhere. Often- 
occurring problems, on the other hand, ought to be handled without the kind 
of tortuous reasoning of complete mechanism modeling. Indeed, human 
experts seem to rely on general "canned" solutions to standard problems. 
They retreat to a more powerful but less efficient "reasoning out" process 
when they have no appropriate canned solution. We envision a system in 
which each schema will contain a particular problem solution technique. A 
schema will be activated when sensors indicate that a problem has occurred 
for which its particular technique is appropriate. Each will contain the 
patterns of values indicating a given problem, as well as the steps neces­
sary to solve the problem. Thus, many different but similar problems will 
map onto the same schema.
There has been little work on how schema constructs are acquired; in 
most AI systems programmers simply "build in" the requisite knowledge 
structures. This is an arduous, time-consuming process and is especially 
inappropriate in a domain such as in-flight diagnosis. Pilots can be 
trained to handle predictable failures of the kind listed in fligt manuals. 
To be useful, an on-board AI system must be able to handle multiple simul­
taneous failures and unpredictable subtle failures as well. If one of 
these novel failure patterns recurs, the system should be ready for it on 
succeeding occasions. That is, the system ought to construct and save new 
schemas it develops. In so doing it might even notice systematic troubles 
and similarities that would escape humans.
In our study of schema learning thus far we have identified four types 
of event situations in which a system ought to construct a new schema. 
They are:
1) Schema Composition
2) Secondary Effect Elevation
3) Schema Alteration
4) Volitionalization
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Schema composition involves the synthesis of a new schema from two or 
more pre-existing schemas. Typically, the preconditions of one schema are 
satisfied in a non-trivial way by the other. In secondary effect elevation 
an incidental post-condition (or side effect) of a schema is elevated to 
the status of a main effect and the remainder of the schema is altered to 
eliminate now superfluous steps. Schema alteration consists of creating a 
news schema by adding a constraint in the execution of an existing schema 
and adjusting the rest of the schema to be consistent with it. Volitional- 
ization yields a new schema by breaking a non-volitional causal connection 
somewhere in the existing schema and adding the potential, at that point, 
for human intervention.
iL'Z' An Implementation
We have been working on an implementation to explore, first, volition- 
alization.
Our initial learning studies have been conducted in the natural 
language processing domain, with a schema-based story processor as the per­
formance element. The stories we have considered are sequences of sentences 
which describe simple events. Schemas are packages of knowledge usually 
associated with such events. Schemas also represent states-of-affairs (like 
possession) and themes (like avarice). Stories are processed by applying 
known schemas to the events observed in the stories. The result of process­
ing a particular story is a network of nodes and links. Nodes represent 
schemas of different levels of abstraction, from "Agrippina possesses the 
estate" to "Agrippina inherits the estate from Claudius." Links represent 
relations between the nodes (eg. precedes, leads-to, part-of).
We believe it is important to realize examples of explanatory schema 
acquisition, so we have analyzed an event which occurs often in mystery 
stories. People kill benefactors or heirs apparent, in order to inherit 
bequests. This corresponds to a volitional schema which might be called 
"facilitation of inheritance by murder". Explanatory schema acquisition 
enables a system to learn this plan for obtaining possession from more 
basic schemas about inheritance and murder.
A simple story which captures the essential details of the example is:
1. Claudius owned an island estate.
2. Agrippina fed Claudius some poisoned mushrooms.
3. Claudius died.
4. Agrippina inherited the island estate.
Before processing this story, the system does not possess the "facili­
tation of inheritance by murder" schema. However, it does have schemas for 
murdering, inheritance, and eating. These schemas include all of the 
system’s knowledge about these concepts. For example, it knows about own­
ership and dying and how these relate to inheritance. Furthermore, the
20
system knows about goals people can have and how they influence their 
actions and how they relate to other goals.
In the course of processing this story, the system acquires the facil­
itation of inheritance schema. Input (1) is processed as background 
material. It does not report an action, merely a state of affairs that is 
true at the beginning of the story. Input (2) is recognized as an inten­
tional murder of Claudius by Agrippina. Yet the system realizes that this 
input is not fully processed. Intentional actions, such as murdering some­
one, require motivations. Since the system knows of no motive for the 
murder, it is marked as requiring further explanation. Input (3) is pro­
cessed as an anticipated effect of the murder. The system can predict that 
Claudius will probably die from its schema for murder. Input (4) is under­
stood as an instance of an inheritance. This is processed with the system’s 
inheritance schema. This input requires further processing as well. The 
system realizes that the inheritance is a gain for Agrippina and has the 
necessary precondition of Claudius dying. Since Agrippina was responsible 
for Claudius’s death, the system assumes that Agrippina knew she would 
benefit via the inheritance and that the poisoning was motivated by her 
desire to own Claudius’s estate. Thus, the system now has a complete 
explanation for the actions in the story. The understanding phase is fin­
ished.
Now the internal representation for the explanation of the story is 
generalized into a schema. The system suspects that a new schema can be 
constructed because a) the no single existing schema could process the 
story and b) the novel combination of known schemas fits one of the expla­
natory schema acquisition patterns (that of "volitionalization”). The gen­
eralization procedure consists of relaxing constraints on the objects, 
actors, and actions in the explanation while preserving the underlying 
structure of the explanation. For example, the system realizes that the 
people involved need not be Agrippina and Claudius. Rather any two dis­
tinct individuals will do so long as the first is the beneficiary of the 
second. Using this kind of reasoning the system constructs the facilita­
tion of inheritance schema from observing a single instance of it.
In more detail, the story processor "understands” this story by apply­
ing knowledge given to it in the form of schemas like the following.
(naive-individual-inherit
(vars (benefactor ?person1
prior-heirs ?people
bequests ?objects
heir ?person2))
(complex (nii1 (poss (actor ?person1) (object 
nii2 (death (actor ?person1)) 
nii3 (nii-conditional-transfer)) 
precedes ((nii1 nii2)) 
leads-to ((nii2 nii3))))
?objects))
For example, the fourth statement in the Claudius story is processed by
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instantiating the given naive-inheritance schema. A node is created which 
stands for the instance of naive-individual-inherit obtained by identifying 
Agrippina as the heir and the island estate as a bequest. Inheritance is a 
complex event. The "complex” slot of the inheritance schema tells the story 
processor to activate three subnodes and establish links representing 
part-of, precedes, and leads-to relations. Instantiation is recursive, so 
that a network of new nodes is established for each new input, with connec­
tions to the old network through recognition of old events. When the story 
processor attempts to activate nii1 (poss (actor ?person1) (object (island 
estate)), it checks the active nodes in the network already constructed 
from the previous three sentences. Nii1 is matched with the node created on 
processing the first input to yield the inference that Claudius is the 
benefactor in the inheritance. The death of Claudius is also recognized as 
an old event, not only because it was explicitly mentioned in the story, 
but also because the poisoning of Claudius by Agrippina activated the more 
general murder schema, and both called for Claudius' death. The third 
subevent is also complex, and expands to a sub-network which captures the 
notion that if all the prior-heirs are dead, then Agrippina benefits from a 
transfer-of-possession of the island estate. The node representing 
Agrippina's possession of the estate hypothesizes a link to a node 
representing the theme of Greed/Materialism.
Notice that the inherit schema was passive or non-volitional. It said 
nothing about goals, and specified no planner. Other schemas like murder 
might well be called schemes. Murder is a volitional schema which may be 
viewed as a plan whereby the murderer achieves the immediate goal of the 
death of the victim.
Certain paths through the network of nodes constructed by the story 
processor can be viewed as explanations. The most important explanation 
chains are intentional explanations, they explain actions in terms of 
themes. The construction of these chains is the heart of the story 
processor's "understanding" process. For example, Agrippina's act of feed­
ing Claudius poisoned mushrooms is ultimately explained by the story pro­
cessor as a case of poison/murder which caused Claudius' death which led 
(through the inheritance schema) to possession of the island estate by 
Agrippina. The explanation is completed by a link from this possession node 
to a node representing the theme of Greed/Materialism, where the buck 
stops.
The role of explanatory schema acquisition is to enhance the perfor­
mance of the story processor by constructing new schemas. If the story pro­
cessor had a special schema for "facilitation of inheritance by murder", 
the processing of the Claudius story might be trivial. Certainly, the 
explanation for Agrippina's action would be much simpler. Instead of a 
rather long and complicated explanation chain through a network of schemas 
including inherit and murder, the explanation for Agrippina's action would 
be that it was part of a plan for achieving the goal of possessing the 
estate, which she wanted because she was Greedy or Materialistic. Explana­
tory schema acquisition can improve story processing by providing such 
schemas.
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The mystery story example of "benefactor elimination" has spurred us 
to significant progress. Progress has been made on a representation 
language for schemata and on a schema-based story processor. More impor­
tant from the standpoint of machine learning is the fact that this example 
led us to an important general explanatory schema acquisition method which 
we call volitionalization. Volitionalization is the process which makes a 
state in a passive schema into the goal of a new volitional schema. The 
new volitional schema is constructed from the passive schema and from what­
ever volitional schemas are required to achieve the goal. Cases where vol­
itionalization is applicable are easily recognized. The story processor 
can invoke it whenever an intentional explanation of an action leads to a 
state desired by the actor in an ordinarily passive schema.
Volitionalization exemplifies the potential relevance of this work on 
explanatory schema acquisition to expert distributed robotics systems as 
proposed in []. Volitionalization makes it possible for such systems to 
understand otherwise senseless action as "part of a plan". A problem solver 
such as an in-flight diagnostician capable of volitionalization could learn 
new plans by observing and understanding actions of human teachers.
For example, suppose an in-flight diagnostics system for the space 
shuttle observed the sequence of events:
1. Space shuttle x was conducting a test in outer space.
2. The cargo bay was extremely cold because no sunlight shone on
it.
3. The cargo bay door of space shuttle x failed to close.
4. Mission control ordered the pilots to re-orient the shuttle so
that sunlight shone on the cargo bay.
5. The temperature of the cargo bay rose.
6. The door of the cargo bay became unstuck and successfully 
closed.
With the proper schemas, with information about temperatures in space 
and the reaction of objects to extreme temperatures, a schema-based diag­
nostician could explain the observations:
A. The cargo bay door failed to close because it was warped by the 
extreme cold of outer space.
B. The cargo bay door became unstuck because it straightened out 
after being warmed by the sun. It was warmed by the sun because 
the pilots re-oriented the shuttle because they were ordered to 
do so by Mission Control. The actions of both Mission Control 
and the pilots could ultimately be explained by the theme "people 
like their devices to function properly". If more basic themes 
are desired, one could continue the intentional explanations. 
Closing the shuttle bay door may well be a necessary condition 
for the safe return of the astronauts.
A system capable of explanatory schema acquisition could apply voli­
tionalization to this example because actions were taken to make an
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ordinarily non-volitional event happen. The usually passive warming of the 
cargo bay door was turned into a goal because it might restore the door's 
functionality. The actions taken to volitionalize the passive "warming-by- 
sun-in-space" schema included "re-orient-shuttle" and "transmit-order". The 
result of applying volitionalization to such examples is a plan for shoot­
ing troubles caused by reversible changes in materials due to temperature. 
A trouble shooter capable of volitionalization might well be able to apply 
the schema learned from the example above to understand novel situations 
which its programmers had not anticipated.
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1. Introduction
Natural language understanding systems are interesting to the extent 
that they understand material that they were never explicitly programmed to 
handle. A system such as ELIZA (Weizenbaum (1966)) or PARRY (Colby et al 
(1974)), which operates primarily by pattern matching, is less interesting 
than a system which has a set of general rules that can be used to generate 
a meaning representation for unanticipated inputs. There are a wide variety 
of types of unanticipated input. Some examples are:
a. New instances of known case frames, scripts, or plans. Each of these can 
be a kind of novel language in the sense that sentences never seen before 
can be processed appropriately. This may mean that information is retrieved 
from a data base on request, or that a representation of a news story is 
constructed and remembered, or that a question is answered about an earlier 
dialogue, and so on. If the general rules in a system are good ones, then a 
relatively small number of rules will allow a program to handle a wide
»
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2variety of inputs, most of which were never explicitly anticipated by the 
programmer of the system. This is the simplest type of novel language, and 
is by now so familiar that it hardly seems to be a way of dealing with 
novel language at all.
b. Isolated novel words that have to be understood in context. Some work 
has been done in this area by Granger (1977). Whenever we can extract a 
meaning structure for a sentence in context, we have some hope of guessing 
the meaning of a novel word. For example, if we were told:
When the tank got low, John filled his car with gasohol.
A system that had some scriptal knowledge in the automobile domain 
could guess that gasohol was a kind of fuel, or possibly a fluid to substi­
tute for oil, water, or antifreeze, or by some stretch of the imagination, 
gasohol might be something to put in a tank that just happens to be being 
transported by the car. Several types of information can be used to con­
strain the possible meanings for gasohol: it is something that can be the 
instrument of "fill", something that a car is filled with, probably its 
tank, that since the tank got low, something, probably the car or John, was 
using up the substance in the tank.
c. Combinations of words that denote items never before known to a system. 
Examples in a) above shade into others where concepts are referenced that 
are novel to a system. For example, complex noun phrases can use familiar 
words to construct novel items, as in the phrase (from Finin (1980)):
...engine housing acid damage report summary...
Here, all the words (engine, housing, etc.) may be known, but the phrase
3taken as a whole denotes an item that may never have been encountered 
before by the system. A program that "understands" this phrase could create 
an internal representation for the item, and infer properties about the 
item, e.g. that the item was the summary part of a report, that the report 
was about engine housing acid damage, that the material of the engine hous­
ing is probably metal, that the acid damage was to the housing, that acid 
damage to metal is called "corrosion", and so on. From this information, a 
system could recognize paraphrases and a variety of references to the same 
item.
d. Events that are novel, as in the example:
My dachshund bit our postman on the ear.
Waltz (1981) lays out mechanisms that would allow a system to generate the 
working equivalent of a mental image for this sentence, attempt to simulate 
the running of a "mental image" corresponding to the sentence, and from the 
difficulties encountered in running the mental image simulation, judge that 
the sentence was at least mildly implausible.
e. New schemas, describing goal-oriented sequences of actions that may 
never have been encountered before, as in hearing and understanding the 
nature of skyjacking for the first time (DeJong (1982). Here, the under­
standing consists of first untangling the motivations for each of the par­
ticipants, accounting for each of the actions that are part of the overall 
schema, and generalizing the schema so that novel occurrences of similar 
schemas can remind the system of the original schema.
f. Novel metaphors and analogies. Here the variety of language that
4requires explanation is staggering. Understanding metaphorical language 
first requires noting that the language is. metaphorical, that is that it 
couldn*t be literal descriptive text. (This in turn requires an internal 
model of what is ordinary, expected, or possible, that a system can use to 
judge the plausibility of novel language —  see item d) above.) Next, 
information from the "base domain", that is the domain in which the 
language has literal meaning, must be somehow transferred (with appropriate 
modifications) to the "target domain", that is, the domain which is actu-
i
ally being described. As an example, given the sentence:
John ate up the compliments.
we would want to transfer material such as pleasure, desire, and "inges­
tion" (suitably modified) from the eating domain to the communication 
domain. The result can become the basis for learning about a new abstract 
domain or it may simply be that a metaphor allows one to express in a few 
words many notions about a target domain that would otherwise require a 
much lengthier exposition. In any case, a system should also keep some 
record of its metaphor understanding process, so that subsequent processing 
of similar metaphors would be eased.
In this article, we look in more detail at the problem of designing
mechanisms that will allow us to deal with the types of novel language
described in e) and f) above, namely schema learning and the understanding 
of metaphors. This work is just beginning. The examples we describe have 
been chosen to be types that occur commonly, so that rules that we need to
understand them can be used to also understand a much wider range of novel
language. However, we must note that there is only so far that rules can
5take us: ultimately the power of systems will depend on the sheer amount of 
knowledge they have, knowledge which can be used as the base domain for new 
metaphors, and schemas that can be used to build yet more schemas. There­
fore, to really achieve something resembling common sense, we will have to 
exercise our rules on whatever base information we have, building a yet 
larger base on which the rules can operate recursively. This important pro­
cess is meant to be a first-order model of the process of adult knowledge 
acquisition through language.
2. .Schema Learning
In this section we examine the problem of processing texts that 
express unfamiliar concepts. Acquiring some grasp of those new concepts is 
an essential aspect of processing such texts. This is different from 
learning new words from context. The distinction here is between unfami­
liar words that express familiar concepts and familiar words that express 
unfamiliar concepts. The former problem has been somewhat studied (Sel­
fridge, Granger, Anderson, Langley). The latter has not.
How can familiar words express unfamiliar concepts? After all, know­
ing a word entails knowing the set of concepts corresponding to its various 
word senses. While this is true, words in aggregate often can be used to 
express concepts beyond the simple composition of their meanings. These 
larger concepts have variously been termed frames (Minsky (1974), Charniak 
(1976)) or schemas (Bobrow and Norman (1975), Chafe (1975)) or scripts 
(Schank and Abelson (1977)) or MOPs (Schank (1980)). Structures
6corresponding to these larger concepts are used to organize world knowledge 
in artificial intelligence systems, and play a crucial role in the under­
standing process in natural languge systems (for example, see Cullingford
(1978) , Charniak (1977)» Bobrow s L  al. (1977), Wilensky (1978), DeJong
(1979) )- We will use the (relatively) neutral term "schema” to refer to 
these knowledge structures.
Very briefly, schemas are used in natural language processing as fol­
lows. A text is input to the system. The schemas relevant to the situa­
tions described in the text are selected and activated. Schema selection 
is a difficult problem, outside the domain of this paper. There have been 
several approaches (e.g., Charniak (1978), DeJong (1979), Fahlman (1979).
After schema activation, text sentences are interpreted with respect 
to the chosen schemas. For each situation the corresponding schema sup­
plies normal causal and temporal connections among events, a specification 
of what is important and what is not, preconditions and postconditions, 
etc. Thus, the use of schemas facilitates the task of constructing a uni­
fied conceptual representation for the text as a whole. In some systems 
(DeJong (1979), Lebowitz (1980)) the schemas are also used to aid in word 
and sentence interpretation.
Now we can ask a crucial question: What can a natural language system
do if it does not have an appropriate schema for understanding a new input 
text? As a partial answer, we will introduce a new kind of learning called 
Explanatory Schema Acquisition. As the name implies, it is used to acquire 
schemas. It is not a universal learning technique. The method will be
7applied only to acquisition of volitional schemas, i.e., schemas used by 
people in problem solving situations. Furthermore, it builds on knowledge 
already in the system and so it is not immediately applicable to learning a 
system^ first schemas. Even with non-schema and first schema learning 
ruled out, a very large and interesting class of learning remains. In 
fact, it seems that a very large fraction of human adult learning is of 
this kind. It encompasses learning schemas from instruction, from observa­
tion of others, from untutored examples, and from fortuitous accidents.
The main argument that will be advanced is that acquiring schemas 
involves generalizing structures made up of old and familiar schemas which 
are combined in novel ways. The generalizing process itself is performed 
through consideration of the interactions between the effects, precondi­
tions and slot filler constraints supplied by the component schemas.
Thus, the method is a knowledge based one. It is capable of one trial 
learning. Moreover, it relies very little on inductively acquired correla­
tional experience.
¿.1. Aa Example
To clarify the procedure, consider an example. This example is a 
story about a kidnapping. Let us assume that we, the readers of this exam­
ple, do not yet have a schema for kidnapping or extortion or any similar 
notion. We do, however, assume the knowledge of a considerable quantity of 
background information about stealing, bargaining, the use of normal phy­
sical objects, and goals of people and institutions.
8Example story:
Paris police disclosed Tuesday that a man who identified himself 
as Jean Maraneaux abducted the 12 year old daughter of wealthy Par­
isian businessman Michel Boullard late last week. Boullard re­
ceived a a letter containing a snapshot of the kidnapped girl. The 
next day he received a telegram demanding that 1 million francs be 
left in a lobby waste basket of the crowded Pompidou Center in ex­
change for the girl. Asking that the police not intervene, Boul­
lard arranged for the delivery of the money. His daughter was 
found wandering blindfolded with her hands bound near his downtown 
office on Monday.
A KIDNAPPING schema, if we had one, would contain information to help 
us make sense of the story. With it, processing the story would be rela­
tively easy.
But by assumption we do not know about kidnapping. Therefore some 
events in the story are incomprehensible. In particular we cannot explain 
why Maraneaux might steal Boullardfs daughter. While this is quite clearly 
an instance of taking something that belongs to someone else, there is no 
motivation for it. The daughter has no apparent value to Boullard; a per­
son, unlike money, cannot be used to acquire other valued goods. Any 
schema-based understander requires motivations for major volitional actions 
(such as a character invoking the STEAL schema). Therefore, this input 
seem anomalous.
The confusion is resolved by the next sentence. This input invokes 
the BARGAIN schema. We know immediately the motivation for Maraneaux try­
ing to bargain with Boullard: he is trying to acquire money. Possessing 
money is a common goal that can be attributed to most people. Thus, it 
serves as an understandable motivation for the bargaining. Furthermore,
9stealing the girl is now motivated: Maraneaux used the STEAL schema to 
satisfy a precondition of the BARGAIN schema. The precondition states that 
the bargain is unlikely to work unless each party indeed possesses the 
item he plans to trade away.
Thus far we have done nothing new. Previous systems have proposed 
understanding new text inputs via analysis of goals and plans of the char­
acters (Wilensky (1978), Charniak (1976), Schmidt and Sridharan (1977)) 
These systems tend to be more oriented toward "planning" or "problem solv­
ing" than "script application."
Once the story has been understood in this way it might already be 
viewed as a new schema. The system could file away the representation as a 
method by which a particular person (Maraneaux) can procure a particular 
amount of .money (one million francs) by a particular action (stealing 
Boullard's daughter and offering to trade her back for the money). This is 
a mistake for several reasons. The most important is that it is simply far 
too specific.
Our concern here is how a system might do better than to simply file 
away a very specific plan. Our contention is that the same knowledge used 
to process the input in the first place can be used to make the schema more 
general. For example, the system has the knowledge necessary to prove that 
if Maraneaux wanted one hundred thousand francs instead of a million, that 
the same plan would work. It can do this because the system knows the 
function of the million francs in Maraneaux's plan. It knows that the 
money is traded by Boullard for the return of his daughter. Also it knows
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that the preconditions for Boullard's acceptance of the proposed bargain 
are that 1) Boullard must value his daughters safety more than the money 
sind 2) that Boullard must have access to that amount of money. Clearly, 
since one million francs satisfies these requirements, any amount less that 
one million frames also satisfies the requirements and would have worked. 
Sums larger than a million francs might work as well provided they do not 
violate (1) or (2) above. We have been a bit sloppy in our analysis. To 
understand Maraneaux*s actions it is not important in reality for Boullard 
to have access to the money but only for Maraneaux to believe he does, and 
for Maraneaux to believe Boullard values his daughter. Nonetheless, the 
point is well made: this event can be generalized through knowledge-based 
manipulations using information that had to be in the system anyway in 
order for the story to be understood. In a like manner the identity of 
Boullard, his daughter, and Maraneaux are not important. What is important 
are that these roles be played by people with certain relationships to 
other people and things. The required relationships are dictated by the 
volitional actions required of the people by the schema. After these 
knowledge-based generalizations have been made, the specific event can be 
transformed into a KIDNAP schema.
In general, the newly generalized schemas require further refinement. 
Due to eccentricities in the input story, the schema may lack information. 
For example, if the first kidnapping story seen by the system reported the 
kidnappers successfully escaping with the ransom even though they killed 
the hostage, the system might acquire a distorted concept of kidnapping. 
Even more frequent are cases where the first schema constructed is correct 
but incomplete. This might result from situations where there are
11
alternate methods of achieving certain sub-goals, only one of which is 
reported. Clearly, schema modification is essential. Thus, the systemTs 
schemas must constantly be adjusted and refined in reaction to normal input 
processing.
lias. .Generalization Process
There are two problems that the generalization process must face. The 
first is to know when it should be applied. Clearly, every input text ought 
not to cause the system to construct a new schema. Only "interesting” 
inputs should invoke the schema acquisition system. The second problem is 
how to perform the generalization. There are a number of subproblems here, 
for example, selecting which events and objects should be generalized, 
imposing limits on the extent of generalization, and actually carrying out 
the schema modification.
There are four situations which when recognized in the text either 
individually or in combination ought to invoke the generalization routines. 
They are:
Schema Composition 
Secondary Effect Elevation 
Schema Alteration 
Volitionalization
In the first part of this section we will illustrate each of these situa­
tions with an example.
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Schema Semposition
The first situation we will discuss is called schema composition. 
Basically, it involves composing known schemas in a novel way. Typically, 
this will involve a primary schema, essentially unchanged, with one or more 
of its preconditions satisfied in a novel way by other known schemas.
An example of this was seen in the above kidnapping story. In that 
story, the primary schema is BARGAIN, a schema which we assumed the system 
already knew. One of the preconditions specified in the BARGAIN schema is 
that each party to the bargain must convince the other that he can indeed 
deliver his side of the bargain. For Maraneaux, this corresponds to making 
Boullard believe that he (Maraneaux) has control of Boullard's daughter and 
can, therefore, relinquish the girl to him. Maraneaux achieves this by 
actually establishing control over the daughter (via an instance of the 
STEAL schema) and then sending Boullard a photograph. To the system, this 
is a novel way to satisfy BARGAIN1s preconditions. We know this must be 
novel to the system because if it were not, the system would already have a 
schema in which this precondition of BARGAIN was satisfied by an applica­
tion of STEAL. But by hypothesis, the system does not yet possess a kid­
napping schema and therefore, cannot yet know of this method of satisfying 
the precondition. Thus, a precondition of a known schema has been satis­
fied in an interesting new way, and a new schema must be constructed to 
capture the underlying generalization.
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¿fi.Qgndary. E£fg-Q-t Elevation 
Consider the following scenario:
Fred wanted to date only Sue, but Sue steadfastly refused his over­
tures. Fred was on the verge of giving up when he saw what hap­
pened to his friend, John: John wanted to date Mary but she also 
refused. John started seeing Wilma. Mary became jealous and the 
next time he asked her, Mary eagerly accepted. Fred told Sue that 
he was going to make a date with Lisa.
Here Fred has not acquired a new schema; he has used an existing schema 
(DATE) in a new way. This is called secondary effect elevation. Fred’s 
DATE schema already contains all of the knowledge necessary for resolving 
his dilemma. The problem is that the normal DATE schema is organized in 
the wrong way. In secondary effect elevation situations an existing schema 
is annotated indicating that the schema may be used to achieve a result 
which is normally neutral or negative.
The main purpose of the DATE schema is to satisfy certain recurring 
social goals (like companionship, sex, etc.). DATE contains secondary 
effects as well. These are often undesirable effects accompanying the 
main, planned effects. For example, one is usually monetarily poorer after 
a date. Another secondary effect is that if one has an old girlfriend, she 
may become jealous of a new date.
What Fred learned from John’s experience is that it is occasionally 
useful to invoke the DATE schema in order to cause one of its secondary 
effects (jealousy) while completely ignoring the usual main goal.
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Just as with schema composition, the existing schema is changed to 
reflect a generalization made from a specific instance. In this case, the 
specific instance is John's interactions with Mary. Notice, however, that 
Fred did not simply copy John's actions. John actually made a date with 
Wilma while Fred only expressed an intention to date Lisa. This is not an 
earth-shaking difference, but in the context of dating it is extremely sig­
nificant. In the normal DATE situation expressing an intention to date 
someone is not nearly so satisfying as an actual date. Once modified for 
the purpose of causing jealousy, however, expressing an intention for a 
date and actually carrying it out can be equally effective.
One might argue that the distinction between main and secondary 
effects of a schema is otiose and, in situations such as this, even 
deleterious. After all, DATE already had all of the information necessary 
for solving Fred's problem. If a system simply treats all of the effects 
of a schema the same, then any effect can be singled out during the plan­
ning process to be used as the main goal. There is, however, a strong 
argument against this position. The possible desired effects of a schema 
do not exist only within the schema itself. They are used to organize and 
select among schemas in both understanding and planning applications (see 
Charniak Ms MAL and frame selection). Many effects (like feeling more 
tired after a date than before) will not be used in the normal planning or 
understanding process. If they are treated the same as legitimate main 
goals the system will be swamped in a combinatorial quagmire of undifferen­
tiated possibilities, most of which are wildly implausible. For example, 
we do not want our understanding process to predict that John will take a 
nap when it it is told that John dated Mary. Given the input "John took a
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nap" the system ought to be able to justify it. However, it ought not 
actively predict it. Given the multiplicity of individual actions making 
up the DATE schema (each with its own set of effects) the vast majority of 
the effects from this schema (and any other schema) are simply irrelevant 
to overall planning and understanding processes. Instead, we would like 
our system to single out the plausible volitional effects of its schemas 
and use only those for schema organization and selection. Thus, in our 
example, Fred has constructed, via secondary effect elevation, a new use of 
the DATE schema.
¿.¿.a. ¿.sterna Alteration
Schema alteration involves modifying a nearly correct schema so that 
it fits the requirements of a new situation. The alteration process is 
guided by the systemfs world model. This is illustrated by the following 
brief anecdote:
Recently I had occasion to replace temporarily a broken window in 
my back door with a plywood panel. The plywood sheet from which 
the panel was to be cut had a "good" side and a "bad" side (as does 
most raw lumber). The good side was reasonably smooth while the 
bad side had several ruts and knot holes. I automatically examined 
both sides of the sheet (presumably as part of my SAWING or 
CUTTING-A-BOARD-TO-FIT schema) and selected the good side to face 
into the house with the bad side to be exposed to the elements. 
After I had cut the panel and fitted it in place I noticed that 
several splinters had been torn out leaving ruts in the "good" 
side. I immediately saw the problem. Hand saws only cut in one 
direction. With hand saws, the downward motion does the cutting 
while the upward motion only repositions the cutting blade for 
another downward motion. I had cut the wood panel with the "good" 
side facing down. The downward cutting action has a tendency to 
tear splinters of wood out of the lower surface of the board. 
Since the good side was the lower surface, it suffered the loss of 
splinters. If I had to perform the same action again, I would not 
make the same mistake. I would cut the board with the good side 
facing up. However, what I learned was not just a simple special-
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ized patch to handle this particular instance of splintering. 
Since I knew the cause of the splintering, I knew that it would not 
always be a problem: it is only a problem when 1) the lumber is 
prone to splintering, 2) there is a "good" side of the board that 
is to be preserved, and 3) one is making a crosscut (across the 
wood's grain) rather than a rip cut (along the grain). Moreover, 
the solution is not always to position the wood with the good side 
up. My electric saber saw (also a reciprocating saw) cuts during 
the upward blade motion rather than the downward motion. Clearly, 
the solution when using the saber saw is the opposite: to position 
the board with the good side down. Now, these are not hard and 
fast rules: with a sufficiently poor quality sheet of plywood 
splintering would likely always be a problem. Rather, these are 
useful heuristics that lead to a refinement of the SAWING schema.
Note that this refinement to the SAWING schema is far more general than 
required to handle the particular problem that gave rise to it. The refine­
ment contains contingencies relevant to the use of saber saws even though 
no saber saw was used in the immediate problem. This is possible because 
the refinement is driven by world model, not just the problem. The SAWING 
schema was altered by identifying and eliminating the offending cause in 
the underlying knowledge-based explanation of the phenomena.
¿.¿.1. Volitionalization
This situation involves transforming a schema for which there is no 
planner (like VEHICLE-ACCIDENT, ROULETTE, etc.) into a schema which can be 
used be a planner to attain a specific goal. Consider the following story:
Herman was his grandfather's only living relative. When Hermanfs 
business was failing he decided to ask his grandfather for a loan. 
They had never been close but his grandfather was a rich man and 
Herman knew he could spare the money. When his grandfather re­
fused, Herman decided he would do the old fellow in. He gave him a 
vintage bottle of wine spiked with arsenic. His grandfather died. 
Herman inherited several million dollars and lived happily ever 
after.
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This story is a paraphrase of innumerable mystery stories and illus­
trates a schema familiar to all who-done-it readers. It might be called 
the HEIR-ELIMINATES-BENEFACTOR schema. It is produced via volitionaliza- 
tion by modifying the existing non-volitional schema INHERIT. INHERIT is 
non-volitional since there is no active agent. The schema simply dictates 
what happens to a persons possessions when he dies.
In this example, volitionalization parallels schema composition. One 
of the preconditions to INHERIT is that the individual be dead. The 
ELIMINATE-BENEFACTOR schema uses the schema MURDER to accomplish this. One 
major difference is that schema composition requires all volitional sche­
mas. This parallelism need not always be present, however. Non-volitional 
to volitional transformation is also applicable to removing stochastic 
causal steps from a schema resulting in a volitional one.
Z'3 .» Limits o n  Generalization
Basically, the generalization process is based on certain data depen­
dency links established during understanding.
After a story is understood, the understood representation can be 
viewed as an explanation of why tne events are plausible. For example, 
take the case of a kidnapping. KIDNAP is an instance of schema composi­
tion, not unlike RANSOM. Thus, the first kidnapping story seen by the sys­
tem is understood as a THEFT followed by a BARGAIN. If the kidnapper is 
successful, the ransom is paid. For a system to understand this, it must 
justify that the person paying values the safety of the kidnapped victim
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more that the ransom money. This justification is a data dependency (Doyle 
(1978)) link to some general world knowledge (e.g., that a parent loves his 
children). Now the event can be generalized so long as these data depen­
dency links are preserved. Clearly, as long as the data dependencies are
/
preserved, the underlying events will still form a believable whole.
Consider again the secondary effect elevation example of Fred trying 
to date Sue. The observed specific instance is John’s interactions with 
Mary. Notice, however, that Fred did not simply copy John’s actions. John 
actually made a date with Wilma while Fred only expressed an intention to 
date Lisa. This is not an earth-shaking difference, but in the context of 
dating it is extremely significant. In the normal DATE situation express­
ing an intention to date someone is not nearly so satisfying as an actual 
date. Once modified for the purpose of causing jealousy, however, express­
ing an intention for a date and actually carrying it out can be equally 
effective. That is, they both maintain the data dependency link for why we 
believe that Sue is in fact jealous.
Likewise, in the alteration example the schema for preserving one side 
of a board while sawing can be generalized. The resulting schema is appli­
cable to circular saws, jig saws, etc. as well as hand saws. Again this is 
due to the preservation of a data dependency link: We believe that the 
wood’s surface is preserved because the surface is supported by the rest of 
the board during deformation due to the saw’s teeth. As long as we know 
which direction the teeth point on a saw, we know how to orient the board 
to preserve its good side.
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.Comparison J& ■Pxa.vi.Q.u.s Mack '
How does this method compare to other learning systems? There are a 
number of previous learning systems that spring to mind: Schankfs MOPs, 
Selfridge’s language learning model, Soloway’s program to learn the rules 
of baseball and SRI’s STRIPS system. The system outlined is strikingly 
different from Schank’s and Selfridge’s. It has some interesting similari­
ties to Soloway*s and one part of the STRIPS system.
While the domain of Schank’s MOPs is similar to the described system, 
the learning technique used with MOPs is very different. The systems of 
Kolodner and Lebowitz both made "generalizations” but these are all of the 
correlational variety and might better be termed "specializations". IPP’s 
generalization that Italian terrorists tend to shoot people in the knee 
caps, for example, is actually a correlational constraint noticed in the 
pre-existing terrorism MOP. The result is actually a specialized terrorism 
MOP to be applied only to Italian terrorist stories which makes a predic­
tion about shooting in knee caps. Learning in both IPP and CYRUS is of this 
variety. Their approach precludes the kind of learning that extends a 
system’s range of processing. Lebowitz’s general terrorism MOP could not 
in principle be learned by his system. In the example outlined, the system 
learned an EXTORT schema without having a more general version already 
built in.
Selfridge’s system was concerned with learning sentence structure and 
the names of already existing concepts. It learned, for example, that the 
words "put on" can refer to the already defined algorithmic concept "get
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dressed in". The domain of my system is learning the original concepts. 
It might be interesting to explore how these ideas could be applied to 
language learning but that would not be the main thrust.
Soloway's system is similar to the one outlined here in that it has
the flavor of one-trial or "insight” learning. Furthermore, he made use of 
general background goal information (in the form of notions such as com­
petition) to aid in processing. However, the domain of learning baseball
rules from game descriptions is very different from learning process sche­
mata. Also, the purpose of his system is very different. It did not try 
to extend the range of its processing in an open-ended way. Rather, it
tried to induce general rules from instances. In that sense it is more of 
an inductive inference system.
The MACROPS idea of SRI*s are similar in that they result in new pro­
cessing structures which can in turn be combined to form yet other struc­
tures. However, the domain of planning paths around blocks and through 
door's is much more constrained and simplified. Furthermore, the MACROPS 
structures were built from a successful planning search through the problem 
space, not in the midst of processing inputs. This makes STRIPS very 
inward motivated in its learning.
Conclusion
There are several concluding points
1) Explanatory schema acquisition does not depend on correlational evi­
dence. Unlike some learning system (e.g., Winston (1970) and Fox and Reddy
21
(1977)) it is capable of one trial learning. It is somewhat similar to 
Soloway*s view of learning (1977).
2) The approach is heavily knowledge-based. A great deal of background 
knowledge must be present for learning to take place. In this respect 
explanatory schema acquisition follows the current trend in AI learning and 
discovery systems perhaps traceable to Lenat (1976).
3) The learning mechanism is not "failure-driven" as is the MOPs approach 
(Schank (1980)). In that view learning takes place in response to 
incorrect predictions by the system. In explanatory acquisition learning 
can also be stimulated by positive inputs which encounter no particular 
problems or prediction failures.
4) The absolute representation power of the system is not enhanced by 
learning new schemas. This statement is only superficially surprising. 
Indeed, Fodor (1975) implies that this must be true of all self-consistent 
learning systems. Explanatory schema acquisition does, however, increase 
processing efficiency. Since all real-world systems are resource limited, 
this learning technique does, in fact, increase the system*s processing 
power. Furthermore, it may indicate how Socratic method learning is possi­
ble and why the psychological phenomenon of functional fixedness is adap­
tive.
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2. .Understanding metaphor 
2*1* Importance metaphor
Metaphors are pervasive. It is nearly impossible to avoid metaphor in 
language use, even if the language is technical. For example, hydraulic 
metaphors are common in economics (e.g. economic pressure, cash flow, turn­
ing. off the money supply, draining of assets, etc.). It is not possible to 
talk about love except through metaphor: love can be likened to a journey 
together, a meeting of minds, complementary shapes (as in fitting or 
belonging together), madness, falling into an abyss, transmitting and 
receiving on the same wavelength, and so on. Jackendoff (1975) has argued 
that metaphor is the basic process by which we acquire proficiency in 
abstract domains; he suggests that as infants, when we encounter a novel 
domain, we use existing sensory-motor schemas to form the basis of schemas 
suitable for understanding the abstract domain, and that this process can 
continue recursively, using existing abstract schemas as the basis for 
understanding novel abstract domains. Jackendoff therefore suggests that 
the surface similarity of "Mary kept the ring in a box" and "They kept the 
business in the family" reflects a deep similarity due to the derivation of
the abstract domain of possession from the concrete domain of position.
)
Metaphors can be used to transfer complex combinations of information 
from one well-known domain to another less well known or completely unfami­
liar one. Understanding metaphorical language first requires noting that 
the language is. metaphorical, that is that it couldn’t be literal descrip­
tive text. This in turn requires an internal model of what is ordinary, 
expected, or possible, that a system can use to judge the plausibility of
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novel language (see for example item d) in the introduction of this arti­
cle.). Next, material from the "base domain", that is the domain in which 
the language has literal meaning, must be used to understand the "target 
domain", that is, the domain which is actually being described. This could 
be done in a number of ways, for example, by establishing links between the 
base domain of the metaphor and the target (novel) domain that the metaphor 
is being used to describe, or by copying base domain structures into a tar­
get domain. The result can become the basis for learning about a new domain 
(by transferring knowledge from the base domain selectively) or it may sim­
ply be that a metaphor allows one to express in a few words many notions 
about a target domain that would otherwise require a much lengthier exposi­
tion. Consider for example:
(51) John ate up the compliments, 
or
g
(52) Robbie's metal legs ate up the space between him and Susie .
Assuming that these sentences represented novel uses of the words "ate up", 
we might want a system to infer that in the first sentence John desired the 
compliments, eagerly "ingested" them with his mind, thereby making them 
internal and being given pleasure by them, and that in the second sentence, 
the distance between Robbie and Susie was being reduced to zero, just as an 
amount of food is reduced to zero when it is "eaten up".
In the following sections I will show methods which will make the 
correct interpretations of the two examples above. First, however, I must
*
This is a slightly modified sentence from Isaac Asimov's X, Robot.
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introduce "event shape diagrams", a new representation scheme for verb 
meaning, which is used centrally in this method for understanding novel 
metaphors**.
£y.en£ Shape Diagrams
In their simplest forms, event shape diagrams have a time line, a 
scale, and values on the scale at one or more points. Diagrams can be used 
to represent concurrent processes, causation, and other temporal relations 
by aligning two or more diagrams, as illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 
shows the representation for "eat." Note that several simple diagrams are 
aligned, and that each has different kinds of scales, and different event 
shapes. The top scale corresponds to the CD primitive INGEST (Schank 1975). 
Causal relations hold between the events described in each simple diagram. 
The names for the causal relations are adopted from Rieger*s CSA work 
(Rieger (1975)). The action INGEST stops in this default case where "desire 
to eat" goes to zero. "Desire to eat" sums up in one measure coercion, 
habit, and other factors as well as hunger. Typical values for amounts of 
food, time required to eat, and so on are also associated with the diagram, 
to be used as default values.
Many adverbial modifiers can be represented neatly: "eat quickly"
shrinks the value of t^-t0 with respect to typical values; "eat a lot" 
increases the values of Q0-q^ above typical values. Similarly "eat only
*#
Only verb-based metaphors will be treated here. These methods seem 
inappropriate for interpreting noun-based metaphors such as "John is a 
rat", or for "phenomenological metaphors", such as "I woke up in the morn­
ing with a sledge hammer banging in my head", as well as for others, no 
doubt. I have not attempted a taxonomy of metaphor types.
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half of onefs meal,” "eat very slowly," "eat one bite," etc. can be neatly 
represented. "Eat up" can be represented by making the
QUANTITY(food/IN1(food,digestive-tract(agent)))
go to zero before the DESIRE(agent,ACT1) goes to zero. This representation 
is shown in Figure 2.
The point of time from which events are viewed can also be clearly 
represented. Past tense (e.g. "we ate 3 hamburgers") puts "now" on the time 
line to the right of the action, while future tense puts "now" to the left 
of the action, and present progressive (e.g. "we are eating") puts "now" 
between tQ and tf.
More levels of detail can be added if needed. For instance, the action 
diagram for eating ought to have links to more general event shape diagrams 
representing the typical daily eating habits of humans (three meals, one in 
the early morning, one around noon, and one in the early evening, plus 
between-meal snacks, coupled with diagrams representing the gradual onset 
of desire to eat after a meal); the diagram for "eating" should also should 
have links to more detailed event shape diagrams that expand upon the 
actions involved (eating involves many recurrences of putting food in onefs 
mouth, biting, chewing, and swallowing, and the diagram for the amount of 
food inside the agent can reflect a series of stepwise changes as each 
mouthful is ingested.).
For more detail on event shape diagrams, see Waltz (1982).
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3.-3.. MS-t&phgr with g.ygnt shSLUS. diagrams
The interpretation of verb-based metaphors is based on the following 
general principles:
1) Both verbs and nouns have inherent selection restrictions. Thus, for the 
purposes of this example, "eat (up)" prefers that its semantic object be 
food, and foods of various kinds are marked by a preference to appear with 
certain actions, such as "eat", "buy", "grow", "prepare", "throw away", 
etc. (See Finin (1980) for discussion of "case frames" for nouns.)
2) Nouns are far less likely to be metaphorical than verbs. If a verb and 
object do not match each others* selection restrictions, the object should 
be taken as referring literally, and the verb as referring metaphorically. 
Thus, we can correctly predict that each of the following sentences is 
really about ordinary actions on food, even though literally these actions 
are very remote meanings for each of the verbs:
(53) Mary destroyed the food. (= prepared badly or ate ravenously)
(54) Sue made the food disappear. (= ate up rapidly)
(55) John threw the food together. (= prepared rapidly)
3) Understanding of a verb-based metaphor involves a) selection of candi­
date meanings using the semantic object, b) matching the event shape 
diagrams of the candidate meanings with both the current context and the 
event shape diagrams of the actual verb in the sentence.
If there is more than one basic meaning candidate for a 
metaphorically-used verb (as in (S3) above) the most appropriate meaning is
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selected by testing the various basic meanings in the current context to 
see which fits best. Once a basic meaning is selected, the event shape 
diagrams of this meaning are matched with the event shape diagrams of the 
actual verb used, and some meaning is transferred. The meaning transfer 
can take two forms: (1) modifying the basic meaning, in a manner similar to 
adverbial modification; and, (2) (more interestingly) superimposing certain 
portions of the event shape diagram for the verb actually used in the sen­
tence onto the selected basic meaning.
This process should be clearer after I show examples of its operation 
on sentences (SI) and (S2).
3.-JL. Aa example
Consider the processing required to handle the metaphor in 
(S1) John ate up the compliments.
Using principle (1) above, we first note that "ate up" prefers food of some 
kind as a semantic object, that "compliments" is not a food, and itself 
prefers an MTRANS-type verb (Schank 1975), in particular either "tell" or 
"hear". Next, using principle (2), we can judge that "compliments" refers 
literally, and so either "tell" or "hear" is probably the true basic verb. 
The event shape diagrams for "tell" and "hear" are shown in Figure 3. STM 
means "short term memory" and LTM means "long term memory". These terms are 
used here with their common sense (non-technical) meaning.
If the sentence appeared in context, we might be able to select the 
proper basic meaning by comparing the two possibilities with our current
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expectations, but in this case, we have to rely on event shape diagram 
matching to determine the best choice.
Let us look first at trying to match "tell" with "eat up". In order to 
judge the quality of the match, we must first describe a scoring scheme.
The scoring scheme used here is rather simple: it looks for scales that are
\
the same, and matches them, provided the shapes of the scale are the same 
(i.e. both are changes in the positive direction, or both are occurrences, 
where an occurrence is defined as a change on some scale from a zero to a 
non-zero value, followed by a change back to zero again. In this case, 
MTRANS matches INGEST —  both are occurrences —  and
INTEND (agent,MTRANS(agent»compliment,STM(agent),STM(hearer)))
matches
INTEND (agent,INGEST(agent,food,[source],digestive-tract(agent)))
—  both are negative changes. There is a serious mismatch between these 
two, in that STM(hearer) does not match digestive-tract(agent) well, and 
these items are the goal portions of the DESIRE, the most important part.
Now consider the match between "hear" and "eat up" As before, MTRANS 
matches INGEST, but now the INTEND portion of "eat up" has no match. How­
ever, IN1 (compliment,STM(hearer)) matches IN2 (food,digestive-
tract(agent)) very well —  both are the major scales of their respective 
verbs, and both have the same "shape", namely the occurrence shape, and 
finally, IN1 and IN2 are closely related binary predicates.
The understanding of the metaphor can now be addressed. Understanding
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in this model is the transfer to hear of the "residue" of the meaning of 
.sat up., where by "residue" I mean the portion of eat up that had no match 
with portions of hear. The residue in this case consists of the scales for 
DESIRE, INTEND, QUANTITY, and FEEL-PLEASURE that were associated with eat 
UP.* Theoretically, there are two main options for the mechanism that makes 
the transfer: (1) the scales may simply be added to the meaning of hearf or 
(2) some of these scales may already be present in latent or potential form 
as part of our understanding of Jifian, and the transfer would then consist 
of boosting their prominence, assigning a polarity to them, etc. Even 
within this single example, there are three kinds of issues that lead me to 
believe that option (2) is the right choice in general: first, it is diffi­
cult to understand why INTEND cannot be transferred to hear unless one 
realizes that hearing a particular item is not something we can ever intend 
in a causal sense; second, the transfer cannot be literal in any event —  
for example we would not want to infer that compliments remain in our STM 
for a day, just because food may do so; and third, adverbial modification 
seems to already require scales to be present in latent form, as for exam­
ple in
(S6) I heard the compliments with great pleasure.
Taking the second option, then, we can construct a meaning for (S1), 
as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4a shows the enriched version of hear used to 
receive the transferred material from eat u p . Note that although the items 
below the dotted line are truly part of the meaning of hearf these items 
would not ordinarily be evoked when understanding the word hearT and that 
really, this version of hear represents three meanings, corresponding to
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"hear", "hear with pleasure”, and "hear with displeasure". It would clearly 
not be difficult to select "hear with pleasure" by matching with "eat up". 
Figure 4b shows the final meaning representation for (S1).
Example (S2)
(S2) Robbie's metal legs ate up the space between him and Susie.
can be understood using similar methods, though there are some interesting 
differences. The object of the verb in this case is "space" which is again 
not an appropriate object for use with "eat up". Again taking the semantic 
object as the item most likely to refer literally, space suggests that the 
true basic verb in the sentence ought to be PTRANS, that is, the physical 
transfer of an object through space. "Legs" also play an important part 
here, constraining the PTRANS to be either "run" or "walk" (this requires 
different processing methods that I have not yet investigated very 
thoroughly). For our purposes, "run" and "walk" look pretty much the same. 
There are some main variants that I believe ought to be represented dif­
ferently, namely the meaning suggested by phrases such as run from (away 
from) x, run to (toward) y, run (without source or goal), run from x to y, 
and so on. These differ according to whether movement is stated with refer­
ence to a source, goal, neither or both, and whether or not the motion 
actually starts and/or ends at the source and goal points, or whether these 
specify only the direction of motion. In this case, the QUANTITY of food 
which goes to zero should make it possible to match the "run to" meaning.
So far, so good, but some interesting issues remain. First, there is 
little residue to transfer in this case, except for the intensification of 
the DESIRE to be at the goal. In fact, I don't think that this is bad, but
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there are some inferences that I make in hearing (S2) that cannot be easily 
accounted for using this model. In particular, there is an analogy between 
taking bites and taking steps, and perhaps more important (and possibly 
related) (S2) seems to focus on the past progressive aspects of the action; 
to my mind the sentence is better paraphrased as "Robbie was running toward 
Susie" than as "Robbie ran to Susie". Overall, however, the account of the 
understanding of the two metaphors seems to capture roughly the right mean­
ings in a natural and (to me) quite satisfying manner; the problems seem to 
require refinements to the method rather than complete rethinking.
1 -5 l* Assessment
I do not want to claim that all metaphors can be handled by methods of 
the sort that have been described above. I do believe that the mechanisms 
suggested above are particularly good and natural for a reasonably rich 
class of metaphors. There still are holes in the theory, however. Consider 
the following sentence (due to Gentner (1980)):
(S7) The flower kissed the rock.
I have suggested that objects ought to be taken literally, and indeed, if 
we do so, we can obtain a reasonable reading, namely that a flower bent 
over and its "face" touched a rock gently. However, one could also take the 
verb literally, and take "rock" and "flower" metaphorically; In this case, 
the sentence could refer to a gentle woman literally kissing a tough man.
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1. Conclusion
This work is just beginning. The examples we describe have been chosen 
to be types that commonly occur, so that rules needed to understand them 
can also be used to understand a much wider range of novel language. How­
ever, we must note that there is only so far that rules can take us: ulti­
mately the power of systems will depend on the sheer amount of knowledge 
they have, knowledge which can be used as the base domain for new meta­
phors, and schemas that can be used to build yet more schemas. Therefore, 
to really achieve something resembling common sense, we will have to exer-
our rules on whatever base of information we have, building a yet 
larger base on which the rules can operate recursively.
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